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Academics and the Federal Circuit: Is
There a Gulf and How Do We Bridge It?
John R. Thomas*
Many of the great research universities of the United States enjoy a close
relationship with innovators. Names like Carnegie, Cornell, Hopkins, Stan-
ford, and Vanderbilt bring to mind not so much these men, but the academic
institutions that they founded. The mention of other research institutions,
such as the Universities of Chicago and Virginia, allows us to recall entrepre-
neurial founders such as Rockefeller and Jefferson. It is appropriate then, to
consider how university research-and in particular, the work product of the
law schools-is faring before that court whose rulings most directly impact
American innovation policy.
There can be no question that the individual members of this court have
endeavored mightily to assist the universities in their missions of research,
teaching, and service. For example, one of the court's jurists served for over
three decades as a full-time member of a law school faculty; another has en-
dowed a chair in her name at one of the country's leading law schools; one
sits on his law school's Board of Visitors; yet another holds positions upon
both the Board of Regents and the Board of Trustees of two of our most
highly regarded universities.
Several members of the court serve as beloved instructors in the area law
schools; others have tirelessly given of their own time to visit our classrooms;
three of them are co-authors of leading patent law casebooks. The court has
even gone so far as to convene formally in our lecture halls. It would be dif-
ficult to overstate, through each of these vehicles, the ways in which these
jurists inspire our students, and encourage them to aspire to the highest values
of our profession. When one considers the other demands upon them, the
commitment of Federal Circuit jurists towards America's universities is noth-
ing short of extraordinary. Each of us on this panel, I'm sure, along with our
institutions, is tremendously grateful for their efforts.
We can quickly conclude that this court, both collectively and through its
individual members, is an institution that values the academy. One might be
inclined to believe, then, that there would be a similar interest in scholarly
research. Here, however, we find a disconnect. In fact, empirical research has
show that the Federal Circuit is less likely than other courts to cite scholarship
in its opinions. For example, a study by Professor Craig Nard revealed that
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the copyright and trademark opinions of the Second and Ninth Circuit are
four times more likely to cite a law review article than the Federal Circuit is
in patent cases.' The raw numbers of citations are even more telling looking
at the last two years of Professor Nard's study. For the calendar year 1999, the
Federal Circuit cited a grand total of two articles; in 2000, seven articles were
cited-five of them in the Festo2 case.' These annual statistics are consonant
with others over the court's nearly twenty-three year history.
Another consideration is: What are the articles being cited? One lengthy
decision that likely every person in the room has reviewed is Phillips v.
AWH Corp.5 In the three opinions associated with that decision, a total of
two articles were cited.6 One of the articles was titled The Law of the Word:
Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court,7 the other was Judicial Discretion
of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above.8 Most of us are well aware that there
is a substantial body of literature addressing claim construction in the post-
Markman' era, both by full-time members of law faculties and by scholarly
practitioners. Needless to say, none of that work was cited in the lengthy
Phillips opinions.
I am by no means suggesting that the scholarly literatures deserves citation
merely by reason of its existence; or indeed that it is worthy of any notice
whatsoever, beyond the weight of its own words. No one advocates the citation
of literature for its own sake, as some sort of prop. Yet we suspect a positive
correlation exists between the rate of scholarly citation and the extent of its
influence. A review of the recent studies by the National Academies, Federal
Trade Commission, and National Academy of Public Administration, as well
as testimony received by Congress in connection with patent reform legisla-
tion, reveals that academic research plays an important role within the patent
law. Yet for matters more directly within the province of this court, it seems
that law professors in the patent field are primarily writing for a limited audi-
ence-each other. It is worth exploring how it can be that the jurisprudence
' Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role of Scholarship in
Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 Hous. L. REV. 667, 683 (2002).
2 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 E3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
3 Nard, supra note 1, at 680 tbl.3, 681 n.53.
' Seegenerally id. at 680 tbl.3.
5 415 E3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
6 See id. at 1308-09, 1322, 1333.
7 Ellen P. Aprill, The Law ofthe Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARiz.
ST. L.J. 275 (1998).
8 Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion ofthe Trial Court, Viewedfrom Above, 22 SYRA-
CUSE L. REv. 635 (1971).
9 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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of the one court most bound up with our country's R&D establishment in
large measure fails to reflect the fruits of university research. I suspect there
are numerous explanations; let me speak to two of them.
A first factor is the lack of established academic tradition in our field. Just
a decade ago, several schools boasted that US. News & World Report ranked
them as having preeminent intellectual property faculties; they also cheer-
fully awarded LL.M. degrees in Patent and Intellectual Property Law. In fact
their full-time faculties did not include a single tenured faculty member who
taught patent law. This was no mere oversight: Many academics believed that
good people didn't do intellectual property, particularly patents.
This statement is by no means meant to denigrate the dedicated adjunct
professors who can bring perspectives to future practitioners that no full-time
academic can. Indeed, the teaching of seasoned, articulate lawyers forms an
integral part of any robust intellectual property program. Yet the demand-
ing schedule of professionals often limits their ability to conduct ambitious
programs of scholarly research. No wonder then, that patent scholarship was
generated quite slowly, and within the academy the field remained something
of a backwater.
A second factor is the nature of this court. It was created to be an expert
body in patent law and, for the most part, is assigned with hearing patent ap-
peals from across the United States. Further, the court aspires to the practice
of panel adherence to the holdings of their predecessors. Reference to other
authorities may be seen as pointless at best, and at worst disruptive. As two
of the court's jurists have explained: "Critical articles may be written by those
who have lost a case, or those who are skilled in a particular technology or not,
or those who have little practical experience or who are seasoned experts."1 °
They further stressed that "we decide cases as they come to us, based on the
arguments raised, the decisions below, the law, the facts, and our best efforts,
not based on occasional journal articles.""1
In an era in which patent litigation has been heavily influenced by the
Daubert12 and Markman cases, the view has a certain resonance. It suggests
that documents not generated within the usual course of litigation should
be eyed warily, as potentially constituting junk law, or perhaps corrupted by
the taint of advocacy. Under this view, law journal off-prints should not be
bound in the tan of Harvard, the white of Yale, or the maroon of Chicago,
but rather the minty green of an amicus brief, complete with a statement of
interest at the start.
0 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 973 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Lourie,
J., joined by Newman, J., concurring).
" Id. at 974.
12 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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Can we predict that the role of the academy change? Today, of course, the
situation regarding patent scholarship is much different than it was in 1982.
Increasing numbers of former Federal Circuit clerks have found a place in
the academy, more law schools are hiring associate professors with research
interests in patents, and the scholarly literature in patent law has exploded in
recent years. Something of a circularity problem persists, however. Perhaps
out of a sense that the Federal Circuit primarily relies upon its own opinions,
lawyers may be reluctant to devote much of their limited word counts to
citation of scholarly authority, not to mention discussion of it-even where
such authority is persuasive and supportive of their position in a particular
dispute. In turn, the Court may simply not have ready access to the scholarly
literature.
Yet there is reason to believe this situation is changing. As the actual students
of the new cohort of academics themselves advance, they are predisposed to
embrace the literature of their instructors more freely. Further, the nature
of patent practice is changing. As we observe patent law firms dissolving, or
merging into general practice firms, we realize that the patent bar is much
less self-contained that it was. As patent lawyers increase their professional
interactions with colleagues practicing in other disciplines-for example,
with members of the antitrust bar, where judicial citation to scholarly view-
points is well-entrenched-we suspect that traditions concerning the use of
scholarship will also change.
Does the jurisdictional grounding of the Federal Circuit necessarily im-
ply a restrictive view of scholarship? In my opinion, this is a reason for this
institution not to shy from academic research, but rather to embrace it. The
jurisprudence of this Court has at times been described as isolated. In my
view, this view is unfair and unwarranted-yet there can be no stronger
response to this charge than through broader resort to scholarship. Further,
nobody reads scholarly writings in order to learn substantive law; the treatises
and commentaries fulfill that need. Scholarship instead allows its reader to
benefit from the insights that a period of sustained study, isolated from the
pressures of time and the necessity for persuasion, can bring. Academics
provide important perspectives from disciplines that are remote or inacces-
sible to the typical patent practitioner; they place the patent law within its
larger legal and social context; and yes, they sometimes take positions that
are unpopular among the patent bar. For these reasons, the scholarly litera-
ture at times merits consideration. The fact that we are gathered here today
to address this important topic provides at least some acknowledgment of
these principles; and it suggests greater dialogue between the bench and the
academy in the future.
Allow me to close by observing that schools of thought, intellectual move-
ments, and cultures rarely prosper when they are entirely self-referential. In
the United States, the role of the university has been a dynamic one; but at
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its best the academy has served as the conscience of the community; as an
honest arbiter of debate; and ultimately as a contributor to the establishment
of just laws. In days yet to come, so it may be within the patent bar, and
before this court. Thank you.
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